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The Jobnson v. Calvert Case
Medical advances in new reproductive technologies con-
tinue to raise complex legal and ethical issues. Last
October, a California Superior Court judge issued his
opinion on the first contested case in this country involv-
ing gestational surrogacy. 1 Upholding the surrogacy con-
tract as valid and declaring that the genetic parents had
exclusive custody and parental rights, Judge Richard
Parslow observed:
The IVF genie is out of the bottle and you're not
going to be able to put it back.2
I contend that we must put part of the genie back into the
bottle. Gestational surrogacy is not an acceptable option
for the extension of in vitro fertilization (IVF). This is not
a reaction to the facts of the California case, but rather a
recognition that the medicalization of surrogacy as a
reproductive technology attempts to legitimize a practice
that professionals should not support.
Following a brief discussion of Johnson v. Calvert, the
recent California case, I will summarize the status of U.S.
and international laws and policies on surrogacy, with
particular attention to gestational surrogacy. I will also
discuss recent ethical positions on surrogacy issued by
health professional organizations. With this background
established, I will outline my position on why the ethical
and legal risks inherent in gestational surrogacy require
professionals to reject it as a reproductive alternative.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Interna-
tional Symposium on the Beginning of Human Life, University
of Iowa, November 4, 1990.
Crispina Calvert, who had had a hysterectomy, worked as
a registered nurse in the same hospital as Anna Johnson,
an ex-Marine, licensed vocational nurse. A mutual friend
introduced them, believing that Anna had wanted to be a
surrogate. Anna was black and a single parent of a three-
year old girl. She had had two prior miscarriages and two
stillbirths. Crispina was Filipino and her husband, Mark,
was white. The Calverts claimed that they could not
afford to go to a surrogacy agency, but paid $3,500 for the
agency's standard contract and some legal advice. John-
son signed the contract.
3
It is unclear whether Anna was ever screened as an
"appropriate" surrogate. Crispina and Anna both began
hormonal therapy to have their ovulation cycles mesh.
Crispina had a number of eggs removed and fertilized
with Mark's sperm and three were then transferred into
Anna. Against the odds, one embryo implanted. For
weeks, Anna received hormonal injections to maximize
her chances of maintaining the pregnancy. Anna did have
to be hospitalized more than once for complications
during the pregnancy. She was also advised to seek
psychiatric help for emotional problems.4
The deal seemed to be working. Anna would receive
$10,000 for her gestational services and for relinquishing
the baby, the Calverts would have a genetic child, and the
IVF program would contribute to another expansion of
IVF for women who would otherwise not be able to
benefit from such technology. But, Anna, for whatever
reason, changed her mind and the deal began to fall apart.
Seeking to invalidate the contract, she claimed among
other things, that she had bonded with the fetus and
sought the court's protection of her future parental rights.
Introduction
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Unwilling to recognize the possibility of three parents and
Anna's role as the gestational mother (and appearing to
doubt her claim that she had, in fact, bonded), the judge
declared the contract valid and granted full and exclusive
custody to the Calverts. s Anna Johnson filed an appeal on
October 25, 1990.6
U.S. and International Developments
Since the Baby M case made headlines a few years ago,
policies on surrogacy have continued to evolve around the
world. 7 In the United States, legislation has been intro-
duced in Congress and in 39 states, as well as the District
of Columbia, to deal with various aspects of commercial
surrogacy.8 To date, only 13 states have passed laws
dealing with surrogate parenting contracts and their
legality. Eleven states have either declared commercial
surrogacy illegal and/or made it impossible to enforce a
contract as contrary to public policy.' A few of these states
specifically include gestational surrogacy within their
definitional sections. 10 Arkansas allows for a birth cer-
tificate to be changed to recognize that the intended
mother rather than the surrogate is the legal mother, but
is vague about the parameters of the legality of surrogacy.it
New Hampshire's recent statute permits, but with exten-
sive regulation and pre-approval by the court, both forms
of surrogacy.12 No statute gives more rights to the surro-
gate with a genetic connection than to the gestational
surrogate. 3
Bioethical task forces in both New Jersey and New
York have also recommended that surrogacy not be
allowed, particularly in the commercial setting, and that
the surrogate be given the right to keep the child.14 In fact,
the New Jersey Task Force recommends that it be crimi-
nal for professionals to participate in commercial
surrogacy. The prohibition can subject the professional to
a charge of unprofessional conduct and prosecution. Such
participation in surrogacy might include screening of
candidates and performing artificial insemination and
embryo transfer with a gestational surrogate.
Most recently, California's Joint Legislative Com-
mittee on Surrogate Parenting recommended that com-
mercial surrogate mother agreements be void and unen-
forceable. Furthermore, the Committee advised that
California law should provide that "when ova or embryos
have come from a woman other than the one who gives
birth, the gestating woman is irrebuttably presumed to be
the natural mother."'"
Internationally, laws and policies clearly establish
that surrogacy contracts, especially if commercial, are
illegal, unenforceable, contrary to public policy and/or
void. 16 Furthermore, most laws establish that the birth
mother is deemed the legal mother.' 7
Of particular interest, Bulgaria declares that moth-
erhood is determined by birth, whether or not conception
is with another's genetic material. 8 Israeli regulations
establish that a fertilized egg may only be implanted in the
intended mother. 9 In Norway and Sweden, a fertilized
egg may only be placed back into the woman from whom
the egg was removed.20 In Spain, surrogacy with or with-
out money is null and void, but if there is a contract for
gestation, it declares that the mother who gave birth is still
the mother.2' The United Kingdom bans commercial
surrogacy agencies from engaging women to act as sur-
rogate mothers22 and the German Parliament just passed
a law banning both surrogate motherhood and embryo
transfer. 23
The Council of Europe has declared that "maternity
should be determined by the fact of giving birth, rather
than genetics (origin of the ova), firstly because of the
relationship between the child and the woman giving
birth and, secondly, because of the necessity of giving the
child a clear legal situation at birth. 24 Furthermore, ab-
sent an exceptional case, surrogate motherhood should
be banned and such contracts should be deemed null and
void.25 The Council cautions that physicians should be
prohibited from bringing together an infertile couple and
a surrogate mother.2 6
Health professional organizations both in the United
States and abroad have also taken positions. The American
Medical Association in December of 1988 incorporated
its earlier report on surrogacy into its official Opinions of
its Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. The opinion
states that surrogacy, whether genetic or gestational,
"does not represent a satisfactory reproductive alterna-
tive for people who wish to become parents. 27 This past
June, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society also reissued, with minor changes, its position
recommending that surrogacy and gestational surrogacy
be continued as only a "clinical experiment." 8
The Committee on Ethics of the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) just issued its revised
opinion on "Ethical Issues in Surrogate Motherhood. '29
The Committee found that the surrogate who both carries
the fetus and delivers the infant should be the sole source
of consent for all questions regarding prenatal care and
delivery and that she should have a specified time after
birth to decide whether or not to place the child for
adoption with the commissioning couple. The opinion
specifically addresses, in part, gestational surrogacy and
recognizes that while the genetic link to the couple is
important, it deems it "less weighty than the link between
the surrogate mother and the fetus or infant that is created
through gestation and birth. 30 Thus, the opinion makes
no ethical distinction between what it describes as "the
usual pattern of surrogate parenting and surrogate gesta-
tional motherhood. "31
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The ACOG Committee further states that the phy-
sician, when approached, should assure all disclosure of
medical and ethical risk and that the provider may justi-
fiably decline to participate in a surrogacy arrangement.
If the physician does agree to participate, strict ethical
guidelines should be followed. Of particular interest is
that the surrogate and the commissioning couple should
be regarded as distinct parties and should be separately
represented, both medically and legally.32
In August 1990, the Working Party on Human
Infertility Services of the British Medical Association
(BMA) adopted extensive ethical guidelines on surrogacy.33
These guidelines supersede a 1987 ruling that doctors
should not take part in surrogacy arrangements until the
BMA had agreed upon ethical controls.3 4 The BMA
guidelines warn physicians that surrogacy arrangements
are unenforceable in law and that either of the parties
cannot be prevented from breach.3" The guidelines pro-
vide that surrogacy be a last resort, that doctors only
consider as surrogates those women who have a partner
and already have one child. Physicians should also warn
both the commissioning couple and the surrogate and her
partner of all risks (which the BMA outlines in great
detail), including the possibility that the surrogate may
refuse to relinquish the child and that the commissioning
couple may refuse to accept a child born with any de-
fects.3 6 The Working Party makes no ethical or legal
distinction between genetic and gestational surrogacy. In
fact, they note that "whatever the genetic origins of a
child, and regardless of the wishes of the participants, the
law regards the child as belonging to the mother who
delivered it. "17
The Gestational Surrogacy Process:
Ethical and Legal Problems
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and
the British Medical Association both have accepted the
political reality that infertility specialists fear restrictions
on their practice. In fact, some IVF programs are acting to
create increasing demand for legalized surrogacy.
Surrogacy in this medical context reduces gestation to a
technological tool. This is understandable considering the
increasing expectation of the couple believing that with
enough technology anyone can have a baby.
At the same time this medicalization reduces the role
played by the gestational mother in the creation of life.
The surrogate is deemed to be making a healthy adjust-
ment if she remains unconnected-the most unnatural of
feelings. Reducing women to extensions of a medical
process in this manner can lead to numerous dangerous
consequences.
Furthermore, as an international matter, gestational
surrogacy has the potential to exploit poor women from
Third World countries, who may be desperate for money,
and perhaps harbor the false hope of immigrating to the
United States. Rich white couples, in turn desperate for a
genetic connection, can use poor women to achieve their
wishes. Health care professionals cannot condone using
women in this way.
I would strongly urge health professionals to resist
any support of the use of a gestational surrogate. Obvi-
ously we all want to satisfy the infertile couple with the
option of IVF. But we have to set limits when another
woman, also being treated as a unit by the IVF program,
is involved. We are pitting mothers against each other and
potentially the health care provider is in the middle of the
conflict. The right law, the right contract, and the right
counseling will not be able to correct the problems with
gestational surrogacy. 38
I do not make this argument in defense of Anna
Johnson, or in reaction to that case. Although I am
surprised that we have not seem more cases yet, they will
come and the health care provider will be in a no-win
position.39 In the following sections this paper will high-
light the specific issues that gestational surrogacy poses
for the health care professional throughout the process.
Screening
Proponents of surrogacy believe that with enough screen-
ing by qualified professionals, surrogacy can be a success.
The recent New Hampshire statute, 40 in fact, provides for
professional screening of both the couple and the surro-
gate to assure a court in a pre-approval process that the
contract will work. Yet what are we screening for?
For example, how does a psychologist assess whether
a gestational surrogate is a good risk ?41 If she is less willing
to want to bond because there is no genetic connection,
will she remain this way throughout the gestational
process? And what if she does continue to feel removed,
because there is no genetic connection? Will this influence
her prenatal behavior and make her a bad risk and a non-
compliant patient? The data does not exist to develop the
perfect profile of the surrogate and the commissioning
couple who can cope with IVF and embryo transfer. What
are the measures of motivation, self-esteem, family sup-
port, and experiences with coping with childbearing loss?
What relationship will the genetic and the gestational
mother have to each other? What perception does the
surrogate have of the father and the future of a unit
relationship? Certainly we do not have experience with
genetic parents dealing with loss to the gestational mother.
We do have some experience that supports the
motivation to deny or omit feelings and relevant medical
information. And there may be even an unconscious
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motivation not to hear or appreciate all the risks when the
motivation is so strong to achieve a pregnancy for the
couple, the IVF program, and for the surrogate to be
successful and to be paid.
In the first medical malpractice case filed that involved
the treatment of a surrogate, Mounce v. Hanson,42 the
surrogate did admit to the physician who took her medical
history that she had had two prior miscarriages and no
live births. She was not screened out. Perhaps more
importantly, she did not state that she had had a history
of heart trouble. She was desperate to serve as a surrogate,
perhaps as a way to deal with her prior losses, and to make
some money. In her eighth month of pregnancy, she died
of heart failure, following a number of warning signals,
and the baby died too. The sperm donor never came
forward, but her family has sued Genesearch, the surrogacy
program, the physician who screened and provided her
prenatal care, and the consulting cardiologist.43
The Calverts also claimed that Anna Johnson failed
to provide them with important medical information. She
did not reveal that she had had two miscarriages and two
stillbirths.44 Clearly, she was not an ideal candidate, either
medically or psychologically, for a surrogacy deal. When
money is involved and when we all want something badly
enough, screening may be of limited use without all the
facts. And even if we think we have all the facts, we have
to decide which facts are the ones that matter.
Thus, in spite of the call for screening to assure that
the deal has the "Good Housekeeping seal of approval,"
the process is flawed. First of all, we have no consensus on
what we are screening for. Medically, what are the
standards for an acceptable surrogate? The existence of a
uterus and a willing carrier is not good enough. Rather,
I would argue that at the present time an infertile couple
is not a candidate for IVF if the woman is not able to be
the birth mother. As noted earlier, Norway, Sweden and
Israel require that IVF only be allowed if the woman is
implanted with her own genetic material.4"
Secondly, we do not know what the acceptable
psychological profile is for a low risk couple and surro-
gate. And finally, professionals are not qualified to deter-
mine what information is meaningful. The ethical and
legal, not to mention medical and psychological risks, are
not clear, and by definition, they may never be.
Informed Consent
Assuming that both the couple and the surrogate pass the
screening requirements, an elaborate informed consent
process is to follow. ACOG, for example, recommends
that the medical and ethical risks be carefully spelled out
to the couple and the surrogate.4 6 The New Hampshire
statute also requires an extensive evaluation, counseling,
and informed consent process. 47 But are health care pro-
viders qualified to do the job? And do they have enough
information to make the process meaningful? How does
a gestational surrogate consent knowingly to relinquish-
ment of a future child? She may have experienced a birth,
but is it easier or harder to relinquish if you have no
genetic connection? Is the lack of a genetic connection
relevant at all? Obviously, genetics matter to the couple,
who may feel more strongly about losing their wholly
genetic child.
In fact, how does a provider describe the ethical and
legal risks? Legally, less than a quarter of the states have
laws that either hold surrogacy contracts unenforceable
or heavily regulate it.48 Under traditional family law,
rather than contract law, the birth mother is the mother.
Yet, in Johnson v. Calvert the lower court in California
found that genetics was all that mattered and the gesta-
tional mother had no rights.49
Clearly, informed consent based on legal risks is
risky at best. There are no guarantees. Nor are there any
guarantees with respect to psychological risk for the
couple, the surrogate, or the surrogate's family. Medi-
cally, there are unknown long-term risks associated with
fertility drugs, IVF procedures, risk to the child, and risks
to the gestational surrogate from multiple gestation.
Obviously, the medical risks are more significant for the
gestational surrogate than for the surrogate who is just
artificially inseminated and usually carries just a single
fetus to term. Again, it is one thing to risk your own body.
It is quite another to achieve "voluntary" consent to
experiment with another woman's body for the couple's
benefit.
Conflict of interest and the embryo transfer
Assuming some form of informed consent is attempted,
there still remain problems with the inherent conflict of
interest of the IVF program promoting embryo transfer
with a gestational surrogate. The couple and surrogate
are treated like a unit with the same interest-the achieve-
ment of a successful pregnancy. The client though, is not
the surrogate, but the paying couple. The surrogate is
needed to allow the provider to extend the potential of
IVF use into a "uterine carrier." The surrogate is a means
to an end. How can the physician maintain a confidential
relationship with two women who both are potential
mothers of the same baby or babies?
Furthermore, the medical risks are significant for
both the genetic and gestational mother. First the ovula-
tion cycles must coincide. Drugs are necessary to manipu-
late their cycles. Fertility drugs also help stimulate the
production of eggs for the genetic mother-to-be so that a
number of eggs can be retrieved. This woman is clearly
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risking a lot to make the process work. The egg is then
fertilized with the husband's sperm and any resulting
embryos are transferred into the gestational surrogate.
The surrogate continues on hormonal injection for a
number of weeks to maximize the chances of a successful
implantation and pregnancy. The IVF program has a
responsibility to the well-being of all members of this unit.
This is a risky business. Once the IVF process is
finished, the IVF program may think its job is over. A
pregnancy (or pregnancies) has been achieved, yet there is
potential for future maternal morbidity and mortality for
both mothers-to-be. It is one thing to assume these risks
when the genetic mother is to also be the host uterus. It is
different however, when there is potential for conflict
within the unit. In fact, all the parties cannot be treated as
a unit. They are individual patients, with individual
needs, and the provider must avoid all appearances of any
conflict of interest. By its very definition, IVF and embryo
transfer with a gestational surrogate is a case of potential
conflict of interest. The ACOG Committee Opinion states
conflict of interest must be avoided by the use of separate
medical providers for infertility and care to the surro-
gate. 0
For the process to work, will we tolerate inherent
conflict which clearly favors the interests of the consum-
ers of the IVF technology over the surrogate? Does the IVF
provider have, in fact, a physician-patient relationship
with the surrogate, or does the provider take the surrogate
as a mere extension of the procedure? How much respon-
sibility will the IVF program take for screening a surro-
gate? If the surrogate is good enough for the couple, is the
surrogate good enough for the IVF provider? It is the
responsibility of the provider to warn the surrogate of all
risks, but is not this then in conflict with the couple's goals
and interests?
The ACOG Committee Opinion provides that the
surrogate is the source of all medical decisions with
respect to the pregnancy."' For in fact, once the transfer is
complete, all biological connections are made by the
gestational mother-to-be. She is more than a uterine
container.5 2 She provides all the nutrients and bodily
functions necessary to make this embryo grow into a fetus
and then a baby. Clearly the interest of all is in her physical
and emotional well-being. And any psychological coun-
seling necessary during pregnancy must be directed to
doing what is best for the pregnant woman.
Multiple embryo transfer
It is common IVF practice to transfer at least three
fertilized embryos. Some IVF programs transfer up to
six. 3 Obviously, this practice attempts to maximize the
chances of achieving a pregnancy. However, the chances
of twins, triplets and maybe more are not remote. A recent
World Health Organization study on IVF found that with
the potential for multiple birth, maternal morbidity and
mortality as well as infant morbidity and mortality sig-
nificantly increase. 4 If the genetic mother chooses to take
this risk with her body, it is one thing. But health care
professionals should not be imposing such risks on the
gestational surrogate whose body is being used for the
couple's benefit.
Multiple gestation and its risks raise problems for
gestational surrogacy that were not considered with
genetic surrogacy in which single gestation is the norm.
The risks to all parties, including the liability of the IVF
physician, increase. It is more likely that the gestational
surrogate will become a high risk pregnancy, will require
a cesarean section delivery, will have more complications,
more monitoring, and be unable to continue working
throughout the pregnancy. And how do we then fairly
compensate for this additional burden of gestational
service and relinquishing more than one baby?
The potential conflict of interest for the IVF provider
appears again. Just how many embryos are right to
transfer? On the one hand, selective termination of the
"extras" might be the answer for the genetic couple. 5
This way they can choose two and let the rest go. But what
about the surrogate's view? Perhaps she will not want to
abort and will risk carrying all three or four to term. Of
course, this decision also raises the risk to her and the
fetuses.
Ultimately, if the gestational surrogate is the decision-
maker for medical care, she and not the genetic couple
must decide what is best for her health and the health of
the fetuses, including selective termination of pregnancy.
This is not to say that the couple and provider will not
exert a lot of pressure on her.
Prenatal diagnosis and genetic testing
A standard surrogate contract will require the surrogate
to undergo genetic testing, including amniocentesis to
establish whether or not there are any genetic or chromo-
somal abnormalities. Yet is not this a strange requirement
for the gestational surrogate? The gestational surrogate is
being asked to undergo such procedures, when she is not
the genetic carrier of the problems being screened for.
Obviously genetic counseling has no function for her.
Such counseling is relevant to the genetic couple, but it is
the surrogate who is subjecting herself to the testing. Once
again she would have the right not to abort a defective
fetus, but if the couple then rejects the fetus, who gets the
child? Unless the surrogate chooses to keep the child with
no genetic link to her, the child may become a ward of the
state. What if she does choose to abort the fetus, because
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she does not want to carry a "defective" pregnancy, and
the couple still wants the pregnancy to continue? It is the
couple's genetic material and they are willing to accept the
result. Yet, if they desire the surrogate to have genetic
testing, it would seem that the couple would have to
accept her decision to abort. Regardless of the result, the
use of genetic testing with gestational surrogates raises
unique ethical and legal challenges for the provider.
Control of behavioral lifestyle and work environment
In addition to genetic testing, surrogate contracts often
require that surrogates do not drink, smoke, or take illicit
drugs. Enforcement of such provisions is problematic.
They require that the physician take on the role of spy,
rather than the fiduciary role to the patient. In fact, the
ACOG Committee Opinion clearly provides that the
confidential relationship remains with the surrogate.5 6
However, with gestational surrogacy, it would seem
that the couple, and perhaps the physician, will feel more
need to control the gestational surrogate. If she is less
attached, since she has no genetic connection, they may
fear she will be less concerned with taking care of herself
and the fetus. There have been cases in which health care
providers have gone to court to try to force certain
treatments, or cesarean section deliveries.5 7 Although it
may seem unlikely, the couple, with the support of the
provider, after investing so much time, emotional energy,
and money in achieving a pregnancy, may feel they have
no other recourse than to go to court to attempt to protect
their genetic material from any negative behaviors of the
surrogate. The couple might try to argue that their intention
to rear the child, as well as the force of the contract, gives
them legal standing to seek an injunction to get the
surrogate to undergo a medical procedure or to stop
smoking, drinking, or taking drugs during the pregnancy.
It is not clear whether the court would be more or less
concerned about the autonomy of the pregnant woman to
control her own body when she does not have the
intention to bear the child and accept the consequences of
her actions. One also wonders what the psychological
impact of not carrying a genetic fetus has on the acts and
behavior of the surrogate, as well as on the health of the
uterine environment. If in fact, it is easier to separate, is it
easier to ignore other concerns for the fetus?
Furthermore, what will be the implications for
employment of the surrogate? Is gestating her only job?
Does she have the right to continue any other employ-
ment? If she works in a lead factory, must she be forced
to be transferred or fired?si What if she is having twins
and is told "to get off her feet?" If she stops working, will
the couple pay her lost earnings? Will she be barred from
disability payments if pregnancy resulted from an embryo
transfer for hire? What role will the provider play in
helping her to obtain disability coverage? With the in-
crease in medical risk comes increasing economic risk.
Birth defects and causation
Unfortunately, no one can guarantee the birth of a healthy
child. With gestational surrogacy, it may be more difficult
to determine the cause of a problem at birth. Was it a
genetic problem? Was it the work environment that the
surrogate worked in? Was it the one drink? Was it caused
by a sexually transmitted disease that she caught during
relations with her husband? Gestational surrogacy takes
genetics out of the picture, but it may be difficult to pin the
problem on a particular cause. In the end, will the couple
and/or the surrogate, if she retains custody, look to the
physician for a financial solution through a liability
claim? With so much that cannot be controlled in the birth
process, and with such high expectations and expenses
generated from IVF and embryo transfer, a liability threat
from both the surrogates9 and commissioning couple
should not be minimized.
Conclusion
State courts and legislatures, health professional organi-
zations, and policymakers throughout the world are
struggling to develop laws and guidelines to address the
complex questions raised by the expansion of new repro-
ductive technologies. Clearly, infertility specialists are
sincerely devoted to trying to help couples have their own
babies. But health care professionals must resist the
temptation to expand the use of IVF and embryo transfer
with gestational surrogacy. The medical, ethical and legal
risks of using another woman to serve the interests of the
infertile couple cannot be minimized. Gestational
surrogacy is not a cure for infertility, but rather a course
to be avoided.
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